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-rw-r--r--src/cmd/auth/secstore/pak.c344
1 files changed, 344 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/src/cmd/auth/secstore/pak.c b/src/cmd/auth/secstore/pak.c
new file mode 100644
index 00000000..fb008e0f
--- /dev/null
+++ b/src/cmd/auth/secstore/pak.c
@@ -0,0 +1,344 @@
+// PAK is an encrypted key exchange protocol designed by Philip MacKenzie et al.
+// It is patented and use outside Plan 9 requires you get a license.
+// (All other EKE protocols are patented as well, by Lucent or others.)
+#include <u.h>
+#include <libc.h>
+#include <mp.h>
+#include <libsec.h>
+#include "SConn.h"
+#include "secstore.h"
+
+extern int verbose;
+
+char VERSION[] = "secstore";
+static char *feedback[] = {"alpha","bravo","charlie","delta","echo","foxtrot","golf","hotel"};
+
+typedef struct PAKparams{
+ mpint *q, *p, *r, *g;
+} PAKparams;
+
+static PAKparams *pak;
+
+// from seed EB7B6E35F7CD37B511D96C67D6688CC4DD440E1E
+static void
+initPAKparams(void)
+{
+ if(pak)
+ return;
+ pak = (PAKparams*)emalloc(sizeof(*pak));
+ pak->q = strtomp("E0F0EF284E10796C5A2A511E94748BA03C795C13", nil, 16, nil);
+ pak->p = strtomp("C41CFBE4D4846F67A3DF7DE9921A49D3B42DC33728427AB159CEC8CBB"
+ "DB12B5F0C244F1A734AEB9840804EA3C25036AD1B61AFF3ABBC247CD4B384224567A86"
+ "3A6F020E7EE9795554BCD08ABAD7321AF27E1E92E3DB1C6E7E94FAAE590AE9C48F96D9"
+ "3D178E809401ABE8A534A1EC44359733475A36A70C7B425125062B1142D",
+ nil, 16, nil);
+ pak->r = strtomp("DF310F4E54A5FEC5D86D3E14863921E834113E060F90052AD332B3241"
+ "CEF2497EFA0303D6344F7C819691A0F9C4A773815AF8EAECFB7EC1D98F039F17A32A7E"
+ "887D97251A927D093F44A55577F4D70444AEBD06B9B45695EC23962B175F266895C67D"
+ "21C4656848614D888A4", nil, 16, nil);
+ pak->g = strtomp("2F1C308DC46B9A44B52DF7DACCE1208CCEF72F69C743ADD4D23271734"
+ "44ED6E65E074694246E07F9FD4AE26E0FDDD9F54F813C40CB9BCD4338EA6F242AB94CD"
+ "410E676C290368A16B1A3594877437E516C53A6EEE5493A038A017E955E218E7819734"
+ "E3E2A6E0BAE08B14258F8C03CC1B30E0DDADFCF7CEDF0727684D3D255F1",
+ nil, 16, nil);
+}
+
+// H = (sha(ver,C,sha(passphrase)))^r mod p,
+// a hash function expensive to attack by brute force.
+static void
+longhash(char *ver, char *C, uchar *passwd, mpint *H)
+{
+ uchar *Cp;
+ int i, n, nver, nC;
+ uchar buf[140], key[1];
+
+ nver = strlen(ver);
+ nC = strlen(C);
+ n = nver + nC + SHA1dlen;
+ Cp = (uchar*)emalloc(n);
+ memmove(Cp, ver, nver);
+ memmove(Cp+nver, C, nC);
+ memmove(Cp+nver+nC, passwd, SHA1dlen);
+ for(i = 0; i < 7; i++){
+ key[0] = 'A'+i;
+ hmac_sha1(Cp, n, key, sizeof key, buf+i*SHA1dlen, nil);
+ }
+ memset(Cp, 0, n);
+ free(Cp);
+ betomp(buf, sizeof buf, H);
+ mpmod(H, pak->p, H);
+ mpexp(H, pak->r, pak->p, H);
+}
+
+// Hi = H^-1 mod p
+char *
+PAK_Hi(char *C, char *passphrase, mpint *H, mpint *Hi)
+{
+ uchar passhash[SHA1dlen];
+
+ sha1((uchar *)passphrase, strlen(passphrase), passhash, nil);
+ initPAKparams();
+ longhash(VERSION, C, passhash, H);
+ mpinvert(H, pak->p, Hi);
+ return mptoa(Hi, 64, nil, 0);
+}
+
+// another, faster, hash function for each party to
+// confirm that the other has the right secrets.
+static void
+shorthash(char *mess, char *C, char *S, char *m, char *mu, char *sigma, char *Hi, uchar *digest)
+{
+ SHA1state *state;
+
+ state = sha1((uchar*)mess, strlen(mess), 0, 0);
+ state = sha1((uchar*)C, strlen(C), 0, state);
+ state = sha1((uchar*)S, strlen(S), 0, state);
+ state = sha1((uchar*)m, strlen(m), 0, state);
+ state = sha1((uchar*)mu, strlen(mu), 0, state);
+ state = sha1((uchar*)sigma, strlen(sigma), 0, state);
+ state = sha1((uchar*)Hi, strlen(Hi), 0, state);
+ state = sha1((uchar*)mess, strlen(mess), 0, state);
+ state = sha1((uchar*)C, strlen(C), 0, state);
+ state = sha1((uchar*)S, strlen(S), 0, state);
+ state = sha1((uchar*)m, strlen(m), 0, state);
+ state = sha1((uchar*)mu, strlen(mu), 0, state);
+ state = sha1((uchar*)sigma, strlen(sigma), 0, state);
+ sha1((uchar*)Hi, strlen(Hi), digest, state);
+}
+
+// On input, conn provides an open channel to the server;
+// C is the name this client calls itself;
+// pass is the user's passphrase
+// On output, session secret has been set in conn
+// (unless return code is negative, which means failure).
+// If pS is not nil, it is set to the (alloc'd) name the server calls itself.
+int
+PAKclient(SConn *conn, char *C, char *pass, char **pS)
+{
+ char *mess, *mess2, *eol, *S, *hexmu, *ks, *hexm, *hexsigma = nil, *hexHi;
+ char kc[2*SHA1dlen+1];
+ uchar digest[SHA1dlen];
+ int rc = -1, n;
+ mpint *x, *m = mpnew(0), *mu = mpnew(0), *sigma = mpnew(0);
+ mpint *H = mpnew(0), *Hi = mpnew(0);
+
+ hexHi = PAK_Hi(C, pass, H, Hi);
+ if(verbose)
+ fprint(2,"%s\n", feedback[H->p[0]&0x7]); // provide a clue to catch typos
+
+ // random 1<=x<=q-1; send C, m=g**x H
+ x = mprand(240, genrandom, nil);
+ mpmod(x, pak->q, x);
+ if(mpcmp(x, mpzero) == 0)
+ mpassign(mpone, x);
+ mpexp(pak->g, x, pak->p, m);
+ mpmul(m, H, m);
+ mpmod(m, pak->p, m);
+ hexm = mptoa(m, 64, nil, 0);
+ mess = (char*)emalloc(2*Maxmsg+2);
+ mess2 = mess+Maxmsg+1;
+ snprint(mess, Maxmsg, "%s\tPAK\nC=%s\nm=%s\n", VERSION, C, hexm);
+ conn->write(conn, (uchar*)mess, strlen(mess));
+
+ // recv g**y, S, check hash1(g**xy)
+ if(readstr(conn, mess) < 0){
+ fprint(2, "error: %s\n", mess);
+ writerr(conn, "couldn't read g**y");
+ goto done;
+ }
+ eol = strchr(mess, '\n');
+ if(strncmp("mu=", mess, 3) != 0 || !eol || strncmp("\nk=", eol, 3) != 0){
+ writerr(conn, "verifier syntax error");
+ goto done;
+ }
+ hexmu = mess+3;
+ *eol = 0;
+ ks = eol+3;
+ eol = strchr(ks, '\n');
+ if(!eol || strncmp("\nS=", eol, 3) != 0){
+ writerr(conn, "verifier syntax error for secstore 1.0");
+ goto done;
+ }
+ *eol = 0;
+ S = eol+3;
+ eol = strchr(S, '\n');
+ if(!eol){
+ writerr(conn, "verifier syntax error for secstore 1.0");
+ goto done;
+ }
+ *eol = 0;
+ if(pS)
+ *pS = estrdup(S);
+ strtomp(hexmu, nil, 64, mu);
+ mpexp(mu, x, pak->p, sigma);
+ hexsigma = mptoa(sigma, 64, nil, 0);
+ shorthash("server", C, S, hexm, hexmu, hexsigma, hexHi, digest);
+ enc64(kc, sizeof kc, digest, SHA1dlen);
+ if(strcmp(ks, kc) != 0){
+ writerr(conn, "verifier didn't match");
+ goto done;
+ }
+
+ // send hash2(g**xy)
+ shorthash("client", C, S, hexm, hexmu, hexsigma, hexHi, digest);
+ enc64(kc, sizeof kc, digest, SHA1dlen);
+ snprint(mess2, Maxmsg, "k'=%s\n", kc);
+ conn->write(conn, (uchar*)mess2, strlen(mess2));
+
+ // set session key
+ shorthash("session", C, S, hexm, hexmu, hexsigma, hexHi, digest);
+ memset(hexsigma, 0, strlen(hexsigma));
+ n = conn->secret(conn, digest, 0);
+ memset(digest, 0, SHA1dlen);
+ if(n < 0){
+ writerr(conn, "can't set secret");
+ goto done;
+ }
+
+ rc = 0;
+done:
+ mpfree(x);
+ mpfree(sigma);
+ mpfree(mu);
+ mpfree(m);
+ mpfree(Hi);
+ mpfree(H);
+ free(hexsigma);
+ free(hexHi);
+ free(hexm);
+ free(mess);
+ return rc;
+}
+
+// On input,
+// mess contains first message;
+// name is name this server should call itself.
+// On output, session secret has been set in conn;
+// if pw!=nil, then *pw points to PW struct for authenticated user.
+// returns -1 if error
+int
+PAKserver(SConn *conn, char *S, char *mess, PW **pwp)
+{
+ int rc = -1, n;
+ char mess2[Maxmsg+1], *eol;
+ char *C, ks[41], *kc, *hexm, *hexmu = nil, *hexsigma = nil, *hexHi = nil;
+ uchar digest[SHA1dlen];
+ mpint *H = mpnew(0), *Hi = mpnew(0);
+ mpint *y = nil, *m = mpnew(0), *mu = mpnew(0), *sigma = mpnew(0);
+ PW *pw = nil;
+
+ // secstore version and algorithm
+ snprint(mess2,Maxmsg,"%s\tPAK\n", VERSION);
+ n = strlen(mess2);
+ if(strncmp(mess,mess2,n) != 0){
+ writerr(conn, "protocol should start with ver alg");
+ return -1;
+ }
+ mess += n;
+ initPAKparams();
+
+ // parse first message into C, m
+ eol = strchr(mess, '\n');
+ if(strncmp("C=", mess, 2) != 0 || !eol){
+ fprint(2,"mess[1]=%s\n", mess);
+ writerr(conn, "PAK version mismatch");
+ goto done;
+ }
+ C = mess+2;
+ *eol = 0;
+ hexm = eol+3;
+ eol = strchr(hexm, '\n');
+ if(strncmp("m=", hexm-2, 2) != 0 || !eol){
+ writerr(conn, "PAK version mismatch");
+ goto done;
+ }
+ *eol = 0;
+ strtomp(hexm, nil, 64, m);
+ mpmod(m, pak->p, m);
+
+ // lookup client
+ if((pw = getPW(C,0)) == nil) {
+ snprint(mess2, sizeof mess2, "%r");
+ writerr(conn, mess2);
+ goto done;
+ }
+ if(mpcmp(m, mpzero) == 0) {
+ writerr(conn, "account exists");
+ freePW(pw);
+ pw = nil;
+ goto done;
+ }
+ hexHi = mptoa(pw->Hi, 64, nil, 0);
+
+ // random y, mu=g**y, sigma=g**xy
+ y = mprand(240, genrandom, nil);
+ mpmod(y, pak->q, y);
+ if(mpcmp(y, mpzero) == 0){
+ mpassign(mpone, y);
+ }
+ mpexp(pak->g, y, pak->p, mu);
+ mpmul(m, pw->Hi, m);
+ mpmod(m, pak->p, m);
+ mpexp(m, y, pak->p, sigma);
+
+ // send g**y, hash1(g**xy)
+ hexmu = mptoa(mu, 64, nil, 0);
+ hexsigma = mptoa(sigma, 64, nil, 0);
+ shorthash("server", C, S, hexm, hexmu, hexsigma, hexHi, digest);
+ enc64(ks, sizeof ks, digest, SHA1dlen);
+ snprint(mess2, sizeof mess2, "mu=%s\nk=%s\nS=%s\n", hexmu, ks, S);
+ conn->write(conn, (uchar*)mess2, strlen(mess2));
+
+ // recv hash2(g**xy)
+ if(readstr(conn, mess2) < 0){
+ writerr(conn, "couldn't read verifier");
+ goto done;
+ }
+ eol = strchr(mess2, '\n');
+ if(strncmp("k'=", mess2, 3) != 0 || !eol){
+ writerr(conn, "verifier syntax error");
+ goto done;
+ }
+ kc = mess2+3;
+ *eol = 0;
+ shorthash("client", C, S, hexm, hexmu, hexsigma, hexHi, digest);
+ enc64(ks, sizeof ks, digest, SHA1dlen);
+ if(strcmp(ks, kc) != 0) {
+ rc = -2;
+ goto done;
+ }
+
+ // set session key
+ shorthash("session", C, S, hexm, hexmu, hexsigma, hexHi, digest);
+ n = conn->secret(conn, digest, 1);
+ if(n < 0){
+ writerr(conn, "can't set secret");
+ goto done;
+ }
+
+ rc = 0;
+done:
+ if(rc<0 && pw){
+ pw->failed++;
+ putPW(pw);
+ }
+ if(rc==0 && pw && pw->failed>0){
+ pw->failed = 0;
+ putPW(pw);
+ }
+ if(pwp)
+ *pwp = pw;
+ else
+ freePW(pw);
+ free(hexsigma);
+ free(hexHi);
+ free(hexmu);
+ mpfree(y);
+ mpfree(sigma);
+ mpfree(mu);
+ mpfree(m);
+ mpfree(Hi);
+ mpfree(H);
+ return rc;
+}
+